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NOTES 
ANTITRUST LAW-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-
Antitrust Implications of the Exchange of Price 
Information Among Competitors: 
The Container Corporation Case 
Traditionally, it has not proved difficult to find policy considera-
tions which justify the existence of programs of price information 
exchange among competitors. There has been widespread agreement 
that businessmen require knowledge of all the economic forces which 
affect their operations. Justice Holmes once said: "I should have 
thought that the ideal of commerce was an intelligent interchange 
made with full knowledge of the facts as a basis for the forecast of 
the future on both sides."1 Similarly, Justice Brandeis commented 
that "[t]he Sherman Law ... certainly does not command that com-
petition shall be pursued blindly, that business rivals shall remain 
ignorant of trade facts or be denied aid in weighing their signif-
icance."2 It has traditionally been accepted that the competitive ideal, 
which serves as the ratio essendi for the antitrust laws, is best served 
by full knowledge on the part of buyers and sellers of their respective 
choices.3 It is admitted that the pattern of transaction prices in a mar-
ket characterized by full knowledge would be different from the pat-
tern in a market characterized by ignorance.4 Some prices would be 
higher, some would be lower. Some customers would be denied bar-
gains and some would gain them. But an essential order, a stability 
would be introduced into the system and arguably would enable 
the system to operate more efficiently than would random confusion. 
In practice, however, the dissemination of price information has 
not always served the competitive ideal. In a classic comment Adam 
Smith observed that "[p ]eople of the same trade seldom meet 
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation 
1. American Column &: Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 412 (1921) 
(dissenting opinion). 
2. American Column &: Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 415 (1921) 
(dissenting opinion). 
3. See Turner, Cooperation Among Competitors, 61 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 865, 866 (1967). 
See also Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 584-85 (1925): 
Persons who unite in gathering and dissemination of information in trade 
journals and statistical reports on industry, who gather and publish statistics as 
the amount of production of commodities in interstate commerce, and who report 
market prices, are not engaged in unlawful conspiracies in restraint of trade 
merely because the ultimate result of their efforts may be to stabilize prices 
or limit production through a better understanding of economic laws and a more 
general ability to conform to them for the simple reason that the Sherman Law 
neither repeals economic laws nor prohibits the gathering and dissemination of 
them. 
4. See note 74 infra. 
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ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to 
raise prices."5 On numerous occasions antitrust actions have been 
successfully brought against competitors who, under the guise of some 
type of statistical reporting service involving not only price but 
production, inventory, and shipments data, have conspired to fix 
prices and divide markets.6 The most recent example is United States 
v. Container Corporation of America.7 
Between 1955 and 1963, Container Corporation of America and 
seventeen other corporate manufacturers, which together supplied 
ninety per cent of the shipments of corrugated containers in the 
southeastern United States,8 engaged in an informal exchange of 
price information. Whenever one of these manufacturers needed 
sales information, not available from another source, as to the most 
recent price charged or quoted by a competitor to a specific customer 
for a particular product, the manufacturer would simply request 
the information directly from that competitor. The competitor 
would then furnish current price information with the understand-
ing that it would, upon request at some future date, receive similar 
information. 
The United States Government filed suit in a federal district 
court, alleging that the container manufacturers' scheme constituted 
a "continuing agreement ... among the defendants to exchange 
among themselves information respecting prices ... for the purpose 
and with the effect of restricting price competition among them-
selves .... "9 The district court, unable to find that the Government 
had demonstrated the presence of either collusion or adverse effects 
upon price competition, dismissed the action.10 The Supreme Court 
of the United States, however, on direct appeal,11 reversed the dis-
trict court's decision, holding that the informal exchange of price 
information had the effect of chilling the vigor of price competition 
5. THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 128-29 (Modem Library ed. 1937). 
6. Prior to United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969), there 
had been six leading decisions involving the exchange of price information: five Su• 
preme Court cases [American Column &: Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 
(1921); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); Maple Flooring 
Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. 
United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925); Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 
(1936)) and a major decision from a federal circuit court [Tag Mfrs. Institute v. FTC, 
17-1 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949)). 
7. 393 U.S. 333 (1969). 
8. For the purposes of the Container Corporation case, the southeastern United 
States was defined as including the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. United States v. Container 
Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 21·22 (M.D.N.C. 1967). 
· 9. 273 F. Supp. at 20. 
10. 273 F. Supp. at 67-68. 
11. Direct appeal is authorized under the Federal Antitrust Expediting Act § 2, 
15 u.s.c. § 29 (1964). 
722 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68 
and was within the scope of the ban expressed in United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Company,12 and thus constituted price fixing and 
a restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.13 
The Court's holding in Container Corporation must, of course, 
be examined against the backdrop of previous cases involving ex-
changes of statistical data among competitors. Antitrust difficulties 
involving such systems of exchange have historically occurred in 
industries, like the corrugated-container industry, in which the chief 
product is highly fungible and standardized, and in which competi-
tion is based primarily on price.14 Thus, in American Column & 
Lumber Company v. United States15 the members of the Hardwood 
Lumber Manufacturers' Association submitted to the manager of 
the association detailed and specific daily reports describing aspects 
of business activity which were relevant to the price level.16 The in-
formation was disseminated to all member manufacturers, although 
not to buyers or other interested parties. The Supreme Court had 
no difficulty in finding that the Association clearly constituted a com-
bination to restrict competition and to restrain interstate com-
merce.17 Similarly, in United States v. American Linseed Oil Com-
pany18 the Court was presented with an intimate system for the 
exchange of price information. The Court found that the informa-
tion, which was used exclusively and secretly by the sellers of linseed 
products, was clearly aimed at discouraging independent decision 
making by trade rivals.19 Any freedom of action with regard to 
12. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
13. Sherman Act § I, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), provides in pertinent part: "Every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations is declared 
to be illegal .••• " 
14. The origin of statistical reporting services in trade associations is usually traced 
to the work of Arthur Jerome Eddy, who, in his book, The New Competition, de-
nounced the Spencerian notion of the survival of the economic fittest. Alarmed by 
what he perceived to be the viciousness of price competition, he suggested that, "so 
far from promoting progress, competition stays and hinders •••• Rightfully viewed, 
there is not a single good result accomplished by man in ••• economics ••• that 
should not be attained by intelligent and far sighted cooperation." A. EDDY, THE NEW 
COMPETITION 26 (1912). See also Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition, 
and the Legality of Trade Association Activities, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 527, 543 (1954). 
15. 257 U.S. 377 (1921). 
16. The Hardwood Lumber Manufacturers' Association program was patterned 
after Eddy's work. See note 14 supra. T.b.e slogan of the Association, "Cooperation, 
not Competition, is the Life of Trade," was borrowed from Eddy. Stocking, supra 
note 14, at 545. 
17. The Supreme Court quoted the following excerpt from a letter of the As-
sociation manager: "With this information before him it is difficult to see how any 
intelligent hardwood manufacturer can entertain any hesitation as to the proper course 
for him to pursue in selling his lumber." 257 U.S. at 405. 
18. 262 U.S. 371 (1923). 
19. 262 U.S. at 389. 
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deviation from the agreed plan was forestalled by heavy penalty 
provisions. In both American Column and American Linseed Oil 
unlawful conspiracies were found to exist, but in both cases the 
Court condemned only the anticompetitive results of the conspiracy, 
not the practice of exchanging price information. 
Sugar Institute v. United States20 involved a thoroughly demor-
alized sugar industry with sales running at fifty per cent of capacity.21 
In an effort to offset this industry-wide malaise, some individual 
sellers developed the practice of giving secret price concessions. To 
combat this practice the Sugar Institute was formed, and it inaugu-
rated a price-reporting plan which called for sellers to announce in 
advance any increase in price. A short waiting period followed, dur-
ing which time buyers could still buy at the old price and yet other 
sellers could announce price increases. In practice, if the entire in-
dustry did not follow the price leader, that leader had to rescind its 
announced increase since it could not sell at the higher price. The 
Supreme Court sustained the trial court's finding that the Institute's 
dominant purpose was "to create and maintain a uniform price 
structure .... "22 Even in this case, however, the Court expressly re-
served condemnation of the statistical-reporting system involved, 
even though that system included the reporting of advance prices. 
Rather, what the Court condemned was the agreement to adhere to 
announced prices and terms.23 
The companion cases of Maple Flooring Manufacturers' Associa-
tion v. United States24 and Cement Manufacturers' Protective Asso-
ciation v. United States25 have often been referred to as the Magna 
Carta of statistical-reporting programs.26 The Maple Flooring Manu-
facturers' Association maintained a statistical-reporting service for 
its members, who were responsible for about seventy-five per cent of 
the industry's production.27 The data which members of the Asso-
ciation reported consisted of (1) the average cost of all dimensions 
and grades of flooring, (2) comprehensive freight shipping costs, (3) 
the prices and kinds of flooring sold and the amount of inventory 
20. 297 U.S. 553 (1936). 
21. 297 U.S. at 574-77. 
22. 297 U.S. at 577. 
23. 297 U.S. at 601: 
The unreasonable restraints which defendants imposed lay not in advance an-
nouncements, but in the steps taken to secure adherence, without deviation, to 
prices and terms thus announced. It was that concerted undertaking which cut 
off opportunities for variation in the course of competition .••• 
See Comment, Trade Restraints-Trade Association-Open Price Agreements-Sugar 
Institute Case, 34 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1016 (1936). 
24. 268 U.S. 563 (1925). 
25. 268 U.S. 588 (1925). 
26. See G. LA.,m &: s. KrITELLE, TRADE AssocIATION LAW AND PRACTICE 33 (1956). 
27. 268 U.S. at 566. 
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on hand, and (4) miscellaneous other information exchanged at 
meetings of industry executives.28 Among the price information 
cases which the Court has considered, its opinion in Maple Flooring 
is unique, for in this case the Court dealt exclusively with the prac-
tice of statistical reporting itself. The Court stated that "it is neither 
alleged nor proved that there was any agreement among the mem-
bers of the Association either affecting production, fixing prices or 
for price maintenance."29 Instead of dealing with such an agree-
ment, then, the Court concerned itself with the contention of the 
Government that the result of the dissemination of this type of 
information 
must necessarily be to bring about a concerted effort on the part 
of members of the Association to maintain prices at levels having 
a close relation to the average cost of flooring reported to members 
and that consequently there is a necessary and inevitable restraint 
of interstate commerce and that therefore the plan of the Association 
itself is a violation of § I of the Sherman Act which should be en-
joined regardless of its actual operation and effect so far as price 
maintenance is concemed.30 
The Supreme Court rejected the Government's argument. It found 
no illegal plan or conspiracy, either express or implied, to use the 
material gathered as part of some illegal undertaking. In sweeping 
language the Court affirmed the legality-indeed, the desirability-
of exchanges of information, including prices, in order to encourage 
competitive interchange. 31 
Container Corporation, as Justice Douglas admitted in his opin-
ion for the Court, differed appreciably in its facts from all of these 
previous cases involving the exchange of price information among 
competitors. The Court point out that 
[t]here was here an exchange of price information but not agreement 
to adhere to a price schedule as in Sugar Institute .•. or ... Socony-
28. 268 U.S. at 566-67. 
29. 268 U.S. at 567. 
30. 268 U.S. at 568. 
31. 268 U.S. at 584-85, quoted in note 3 supra. 
Cement Manufacturers involved the collection and dissemination of information 
relating to "specific job contracts" for the purpose of enabling manufacturers to pro-
tect themselves from being defrauded by their customers. "Specific job contracts" 
operated in effect to give contractors options to buy at a set price all the cement 
needed for a particular job. In times of rising prices, however, some contractors ap· 
parently had been exploiting this trade practice by taking more than one specific job 
contract for each job and then using cement bought under contracts for one job on 
other jobs. The information program which the manufacturers' association developed 
to meet this problem was held not to violate the Sherman Act because the information 
did not affect the manufacturers' price decisions but only notified manufacturers when 
they would be justified in refusing to deliver cement at the contract price. 
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Vacuum . . . . There was here an exchange of information con-
cerning specific sales to identified customers, not a statistical report 
on the average cost to all members, without identifying the parties 
to specific transactions as in Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn . ... While 
there was present here as in Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United 
States . . • an exchange of prices to specific customers, there was 
absent the controlling circumstances, viz., that cement manufacturers 
to protect themselves from delivering to contractors more cement 
than was needed for a specific job and thus receiving a lower price, 
exchanged price information as a means of protecting their legal 
rights from fraudulent inducements to deliver more cement than 
needed for a specific job.a2 
In many ways, then, the factual pattern considered by the Court in 
Container Corporation constitutes the least persuasive record of 
price fixing and manipulation that can be found among all such 
cases with which the Supreme Court has dealt, including Maple 
Flooring.33 
But the major distinction between Container Corporation and 
its predecessors does not seem to lie in the facts. The price exchange 
system in this case involved no really novel practice-no practice 
which was not more or less implicitly approved in a prior case. For 
example, the exchange of specific information, present here and 
absent in Maple Flooring, was approved not only in Cement Manu-
facturers,34 but also in a major case from the First Circuit, Tag 
Manufacturers' Institute v. FTC.35 
Container Corporation, then, is not to be distinguished on its 
facts, but rather should be examined in terms of the legal principles 
applied to the factual situation-legal principles which are brought 
into focus by the juxtaposition of the majority, the concurring, and 
the dissenting opinions.36 But before examining the areas of dis-
agreement among members of the court, it should be noted that in 
82. 898 U.S. at 834-35. 
8!1. See Stocking, supra note 14, at 546-67, in which Professor Stocking analyzes the 
record in Maple Flooring and sharply disagrees with the result reached by the Court 
in that case; Container Corp., 39!1 U.S. at !141, 347 CTustice Marshall, dissenting); 
text accompanying notes 55-56 infra. 
34. See note 81 supra. 
35. 174 F.2d 452 (1949). In Tag Manufacturers, as in Container Corporation, the 
product was custom made. Information was not exchanged informally, however, but 
by price tables regularly sent out through a trade association to all competing 
manufacturers and to other interested parties. The effect of the information exchanged 
was, as in Container Corporation, a knowledge by all manufacturers of the price which 
was quoted to a customer in any given transaction, since there was little off-the-list 
selling. But the association did not exchange information concerning the actual identity 
of customers as the defendants in the Container Corporation case apparently did. 
36. The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Douglas; Justice Fortas filed 
a concurring opinion, and Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, 
dissented. See text accompanying notes 51-53 infra. 
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several instances the Container Corporation Court was in unanimous 
agreement. For example, both the majority and the dissent dealt 
summarily with the questions of intent and conspiracy, which had 
previously occupied so much of the Court's time. The trial court 
held that the Government had "failed to sustain its burden of 
proving facts from which an agreement to exchange price informa-
tion may be inferred."37 That court expressed the view, shared by 
by some commentators,38 that the proper standard of proof is a 
rather stringent one,39 and that "[p ]roof of a course of conduct by 
defendants, or parallel business behavior, does not necessarily re-
quire an inference or conclusion that a conspiracy actually existed."40 
Indeed, the trial court suggested that "[t]he conceded freedom of 
each defendant to request from or furnish to competitors, or not 
request from or furnish to competitors, price information on cor-
rugated containers, is the very antithesis of an agreement."41 The 
Supreme Court, however, unanimously rejected the trial court's 
position and experienced little difficulty in finding that an agree-
ment existed among the defendants to exchange information. It 
agreed that there was freedom to withdraw from the agreement, but 
noted that "[t]he fact remains that when a defendant requested and 
37. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 58-59 (M.D.N.C. 
1967). 
38. See A. NEALE, THE ANTI-TRUsr LA.ws OF THE USA 49-53 (1966): 
Collusion means in this context a real "meeting of the minds" in a common en-
deavor to suppress or limit price-competition; moreover, it is implied that the 
plan or understanding can be relied upon with some reasonable confidence by the 
participants. The individual firm, in other words, must be under some fairly 
effective inhibition as regards "breaking the price-line" when the temptation to 
do so is apparently strong. 
The Container Corporation decision seems to diminish the importance of the intent 
factor within the area of exchanges of price information. According to the decision, 
so long as the conscious joint conduct of the competitors has a tendency to "stabilize 
prices," whether or not that tendency is the intended consequence of the exchange, 
the requisite "agreement" will be found to exist. But see United States v. FMC Corp., 
5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1969 Trade Cas.) ,I 72,901 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1969), in which 
a federal district court appears to have imposed a harsher burden of proving conspiracy 
than that imposed in Container Corporation. The district court cited Container 
Corporation, perhaps somewhat restrictively, for the proposition that "[t]he systematic • 
exchange of price information by competitors pursuant to an understanding or agree-
ment that such information will be exchanged whenever requested, and the use of 
such information to stabilize prices, constitutes an unlawful conspiracy and per se vio• 
Iation of § I of the Sherman Act." 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1969 Trade Cas.) ,I 72,901, 
at 87,433. See text accompanying note 86 infra. An alternative type of reasoning 
has been used in cases such as American Column &: Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 
U.S. 377 (1921). In this type of case, agreement is inferred from the behavior of the 
parties. The fact situation is analyzed and an attempt is made to prove that such a 
state of affairs could not be maintained without collusion. Conversely, in Container 
Corporation, as in most of the other trade association cases, the existence of an agree-
ment is virtually assumed and the court concerns itself with examining the conse-
quences of that agreement. See A. NEALE, supra, at 49-50. 
39. Cf. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Pktures Film Distrib. Co., 346 U.S. 
537 (1954). 
40. 273 F. Supp. at 59. 
41. 273 F. Supp. at 59. 
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received price information, it was affirming its willingness to furnish 
such information in return."42 Both the majority and dissent indi-
cated that the exchange of price information is clearly a disfavored 
activity and that the burden of proof needed to establish an unlawful 
conspiracy in this area can be sustained by a minimal amount of 
evidence. In Container Corporation, then, the entire Court was 
much more interested in the effect of the combination upon prices 
than it was in the combination's form and nature. 
The majority, the concurrence, and dissent in Container Corpo-
ration also agreed on the basic economic theory to be used in an-
alyzing the effect of the defendants' agreement on competition. 
Although the Court tacitly acknowledged that the exchange of in-
formation could theoretically be regarded as a desirable means to 
encourage competitive conditions, it recognized that this result could 
occur only within the context of a perfectly competitive economic 
model. All three of the opinions filed in the case indicated that an 
entirely different economic theory, one which recognizes the oligop-
olistic character of the market involved, was more appropriate. 
In an oligopolistic market, characterized by a highly fungible and 
standardized product, a decidedly anticompetitive effect may occur 
as a result of the dissemination of at least some forms of price in-
formation. 43 A rational seller in such an industry may well decide 
that there is no potential advantage in price competition. Any price 
made by one seller in an oligopoly is quickly met by another. Such 
a seller is aware that "a lower price does not mean a larger share 
of the available business but a share of the existing business at a 
lower return."44 Modern economics recognizes that prices deter-
mined in a market occupied by a few sellers selling a standardized 
product do not behave in accordance with the competitive ideal. 
In a situation in which a few sellers face substantially identical de-
mands and costs, each, acting independently but with some price 
information from the others, might restrict output and charge ar-
tificially higher prices. Indeed, it is generally accepted that, in such 
a market, "[i]f each [of two or a few sellers] seeks his maximum 
profit rationally and intelligently ... the equilibrium result is the 
same as though there was a monopolistic agreement between them."45 
Each, in effect, acts as a monopolist. As one commentator has re-
marked: 
To the extent that the sellers anticipate each other's reactions and 
42. 393 U.S. at 335. 
43. Bradley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts: From Eco-
nomic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285 (1967). 
44. Container Corp., 393 U.S. at 337. 
45. E. CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MoNOPOLimc COMPETITION 48 (6th ed. 1950). 
See also Stocking, supl'a note l 4, at 535. 
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become of one mind, they behave like one seller-a monopolist. But 
it is not the number of sellers which is crucial. Some uncertainty, 
some good gambling chance that price cuts will not be immediately 
met, is necessary for effective competition. Some degree of ignorance 
is therefore no blemish or imperfection in a market; it is an ad-
vantage. Too much ignorance, however, keeps buyers from respond-
ing to price cuts.46 
With its enthusiastic embrace of the economic theory of oligop-
olistic pricing, the Supreme Court continued to expand its attack 
on the abuse of power in oligopolistic markets. Students of the Court 
date this attack from the case of Brown Shoe Company v. United 
States.41 Prior to Container Corporation, however, the attack had 
been directed primarily against mergers, joint ventures, and the dis-
tribution practice of consignment selling.48 Container Corporation 
seems to have expanded the scope of oligopolistic conduct violating 
the antitrust laws to other behavioral areas. Historically, a violation 
of section 1 of the Sherman Act was a violation no matter who com-
mitted it.49 Conduct proscribed by section 2, on the other hand, 
could constitute perfectly legitimate conduct when engaged in by 
. a normal businessman, although it violated the Act when it was com-
mitted by a monopolist.50 After Container Corporation, there seems 
to be a middle ground of new section I violations, which can be 
committed only by an oligopolist. Thus, certain modes of behavior 
by an oligopolist, while not violative of section 2, can violate section 
I even though similar behavior by a "true competitor" would not. 
In Container Corporation, then, the Court was in agreement con-
cerning the nature of the conspiracy and concerning the oligopolistic 
framework within which the alleged misconduct was to be analyzed. 
However, the Court found itself in sharp internal disagreement as 
to whether the fact situation presented by the Government fit within 
the applicable oligopolistic pattern. Justice Douglas and the majority 
46. Adelman, Effective Competition and the Anti-Trust Laws, 61 HARV. L. R.Ev. 
1289, 1299 (1948). See also c. KAYSEN &: D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY, AN ECONOMIC 
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 150 (1959): "In markets where oligopolistic elements are present 
some ignorance and uncertainty about the behavior of rivals is an important compet-
itive element in the market, since it prevents 'rational' oligopolistic calculation leading 
to joint maximation of profits.'' 
47. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See Brodley, supra note 43, at 299. 
48. E.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) (horizontal merger); 
FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965), revg. 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 
1964), revg. CCH TRADE REG. REP. [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] ,f 16,182 (FTC 1962) 
(conglomerate merger); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) Goint 
venture); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (retail price maintenance 
through consignment agreements). 
49. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-25 n.59 (1940). 
50. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-25 n.59 (1940). Sher-
man Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964), proscribes monopolizing, attempting to monop-
olize, and conspiring to monopolize interstate or foreign commerce. 
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found the inference "irresistible" that price competition had been 
chilled.151 Justice Fortas, in a concurring opinion, remarked that 
"although [the evidence is] not overwhelming, [it] is sufficient in 
the special circumstances of this case to show an actual effect on 
pricing .... "152 Finally, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Harlan 
and Stewart in a dissenting opinion, stated that he could not agree 
with the majority or the concurrence that the combination "had the 
purpose or effect of restricting price competition .... "58 
In reversing the decision of the district court, the majority looked 
to the period involved in the complaint, 1955-1963, and noted that, 
despite the excess supply and the dmvnward-sloping price levels, the 
industry expanded from thirty manufacturers with forty-nine plants 
to fifty-one manufacturers with ninety-eight plants. Although entry 
into the industry appears to have been relatively easy during this 
period,154 the Court was unable to come to any other conclusion 
than that the continued entry was caused by, and was a sufficient 
indication of, a price structure that was kept artificially high. The 
Court's inference may have been economically unwarranted, for it 
seems to have been based upon a static rather than a dynamic 
economic analysis. Certainly, in a perfectly competitive market 
moving toward equilibrium, such continued entry would not have 
occurred. But as the dissent points out, in the eight-year period 
covered by the complaint, the demand for corrugated containers 
almost doubled.155 It is just as logical, then, to assume that new 
entrants were attracted by an anticipated future demand as it is to 
assume that they were drawn by the possibility of charging artificially 
high prices. 
Indeed, Justice Marshall emphatically objected to the Govern-
ment's hypothesis that new entrants were attracted by high profits: 
"[T]he Government did not introduce any evidence about the level 
of profits in this industry [ or, surprisingly enough,] evidence about 
price levels."56 Again he stated: "The Government admits that the 
price trend was down, but asks the Court to assume that the trend 
would have been accelerated with less informed and, hence more 
vigorous, price competition."57 In fact, while it had ample op-
51. 393 U.S. at 337. 
52. 393 U.S. at 339. 
53. 393 U.S. at 340. A hint of the theory of oligopolistic competition adopted by 
the majority in Container Corporation is found in Sugar Institute v. United States, 
297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936): "The fact that because Sugar is a standardized commodity, 
there is a strong tendency towards uniformity of price, makes it the more important 
that such opportunities as may exist for fair competition should not be impaired." 
54. The Court itself stated that an investment of $50,000 to $75,000 was sufficient 
for entry into the industry. 393 U.S. at 336. 
55. 393 U.S. at 342. 
56. 393 U.S. at 345. 
57. 393 U.S. at 345. 
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portunity to do so, the Government at no time called customers 
of the industry to testify concerning price stabilization.58 
Furthermore, Justice Marshall in his dissent referred to findings 
by the trial court which tend to dampen the "irresistible inference" 
that price competition had in fact been lessened.59 Those findings 
indicate that, despite an increase in manufacturing costs, the trend 
in prices was down. Indeed, rather than finding an absence of price 
competition, the district court reported that buyers frequently 
changed suppliers on the basis of price considerations. The statistics 
compiled by the industry and stipulated by the Justice Department 
showed a marked absence of price uniformity or price stability. 
Moreover, substantial evidence was introduced that the determina-
tion of price by manufacturers was based not only on the knowledge 
of prices offered by competitors, but also on other input variables 
such as plant production, the quality of needed materials, the size 
of the order, and the credit rating of the customer.60 
Justice Marshall's doubts about the absence of price competition 
are reinforced by the fact that the complaint issued by the Govern-
ment named only the eighteen defendants and did not indicate 
whether any or all of the other thirty-three manufacturers in the 
industry, which together accounted for ten per cent of industry 
shipments, participated in the price exchange program.61 Since the 
record is silent on the matter, it is at least arguable that they did 
not participate. This inference raises two interesting questions. 
First, if they did not participate, why were their attempts to secure 
new business insufficient to guarantee vigorous price competition 
in the industry? Second, accepting the argument that small and 
weak firms in a market dominated by oligopolists are willing to 
follow the price leadership afforded by the larger concerns, how 
did the small manufacturers in this case effectively secure the price 
information necessary for them to follow the defendants? The ap-
parent ability of the small firms to secure the price information 
without resort to price exchanges serves to enhance the argument 
advanced by the defendants in Container Corporation that, in light 
of the numerous other means of communication, reciprocal price 
exchanges play a relatively small part in market operations. 
In view of the ambiguities present in the Container Corporation 
opinion, some confusion remains as to the correct rule to be applied 
when analyzing a system of price exchanges in order to determine 
58. 393 U.S. at 345. 
59. 393 U.S. at 345-46. 
60. It appears from the opinion of the district court that knowledge of the prices 
charged by competitors was far more often gleaned from customers and other sources 
than directly from the competitors themselves. See 273 F. Supp. at 61. 
61. Container Corp., 393 U.S. at 343 n.1 (Justice Marshall, dissenting). 
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whether or not the Sherman Act has been violated. It is not clear 
whether the Court in this case adopted a per se rule of illegality or a 
very stringent rule-of-reason approach. 
There is language in the majority opinion which strongly hints 
at the adoption of the per se rule. While it is true that Justice 
Department spokesmen have for some time indicated their support 
of "proper" systems of price exchanges,62 the Court's opinion seems 
to offer some support to those who would invalidate such programs 
entirely by invoking a per se rule. Thus, the Court stated: 
The limitation or reduction of price competition brings the case 
within the ban, for as we held in United States v. Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co., •.. interference with the setting of price by free market 
forces is unlawful per se.63 
At the close of its opinion, the Court offered this additional sug-
gestion: "Price is too critical, too sensitive a control to allow it to 
be used, even in an informal manner to restrain competition."64 
Such language indicates, at a minimum, that the majority took a 
very dim view of exchanges of price information. 
The Court did not, however, expressly label the activity as a per se 
offense.65 In this connection, Justice Fortas noted in his concurring 
opinion: "I do not understand the Court's opinion to hold that the 
exchange of specific information among sellers as to price charged 
to individual buyers, pursuant to mutual arrangements, is a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act."66 Justice Fortas may have attached 
too little importance to the decision, since it is difficult to imagine 
62. Galgay, Antitrust Considerations in the Exchange of Price Information Among 
Competitors, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 617, 619 (1963) (fhe author was then chief of the 
New York office of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.): "Let me 
hasten to say that the mere exchange of price information among competitors is not 
in itself illegal. It is the role which such an exchange plays in any agreement to 
tamper with price competition which determines its propriety." Turner, supra note 
3, at 866 (fhe author was then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Anti-
trust Division.): 
[I]t has always been and remains clear that competitors are free to collect and 
disseminate considerable amounts of data pertinent to informed business decisions, 
even though it is likely that informed judgments by various individual compet-
itors may produce somewhat different price and other decisions than would 
otherwise take place. 
See note 84 infra. 
63. 393 U.S. at 337. The Court clearly limited this analysis to situations involving 
oligopolistic elements by adding the following to the language quoted in the text: 
"Price information exchanged in some markets may have no effect on a truly compet-
itive price. But the corrugated container industry is dominated by relatively few 
sellers." 393 U.S. at 337. 
64. 393 U.S. at 338. 
65. But see Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711, 717-18 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969): "Without inquiry into their purpose or effect, many agreements have been 
held to be illegal per se under the antitrust laws. See, e.g., United States v. Container 
Corporation of America . • •• " 
66. 393 U.S. at 338-39. 
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a situation after Container Corporation in which sellers would ex-
change particularized price information, at least with regard to cur-
rent and future prices to specified customers. But Fortas' statement 
does offer the insight that the Court, while mindful that it was ap-
proaching the brink of the per se test, hesitated-at this time-from 
crossing the final line. There are several possible reasons for such 
hesitancy. Historically, the per se rule has been applied only to situ-
ations in which there is an "inference or presumption" either that 
the primary intent underlying the practice involved is to achieve 
an anticompetitive effect, or that, absent such intent, a high prob-
ability remains that the efficiency of the practice will be outweighed 
by an anticompetitive effect.67 As previously mentioned, there are 
sound economic considerations which might justify a program such 
as that before the Court in Container Corporation.68 Furthermore, 
it may be that the Court implicitly recognized that, in light of the 
limited level of economic knowledge, it is difficult to define with any 
degree of certainty the level of economic concentration in an oligop-
olistic market sufficient for that market to behave monopolistically.69 
Thus, the Court may have found it much easier and just as effective 
to apply a stringent test under the rule of reason to determine the 
effect upon prices.70 
Assuming that the Court did not adopt a per se test-and that 
assumption is by no means certain-it still seems to have indicated 
that it will not tolerate significant effects upon the price structure 
arising from the exchange of information. The Court stated that 
"[t]he result of this reciprocal exchange of prices was to stabilize 
prices though at a dmrnward level,"71 and added that "[s]tabilizing 
prices as well as raising them is within the ban of § 1 of the Sherman 
Act."72 Moreover, it cited Socony-V acuum for the principle that "in 
terms of market operations stabilization is but one form of manipula-
67. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1967); 
Van Cise, Future of Per Se in Antitrust, 50 VA. L. REv. 1165, 1172 (1964). 
68. See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra. 
69. The problem of market definition will doubtless be of considerable importance 
in future applications of the principles of Container Corporation. It is conceivable 
that differing types of price exchanges might be permissible if there are differing 
economic concentrations and conditions. There are, of course, some markets character-
ized by so concentrated an oligopolistic framework-markets such as steel, aluminum, 
oil, and sugar-that any price exchange at all would automatically be invalidated. The 
number of competitors, however, might not be crucial in determining the economic 
conditions of the market. See C. KAYSEN &: D. TURNER, supra note 46, at 150; Adelman, 
supra note 46, at 1299. In Container Corporation, for example, the market consisted 
of fifty-one producers, yet the Court deemed an oligopolistic analysis to be appropriate. 
393 U.S. at 336-37. 
70. See 393 U.S. at 841 Gustice Marshall, dissenting). 
71. 393 U.S. at 336. 
72. 393 U.S. at 337. 
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tion. "73 Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that the Court, in 
attacking stabilization, meant to condemn all attempts to narrow 
the range and extreme variations of prices quoted at a given price 
level. Price stabilization has usually been thought to refer not only 
to fluctuations of price level, but also to extremes of variation within 
the price structure at any given average level. Yet to interpret the 
ban on stabilization as expressed in Socony-Vacuum to condemn at-
tempts to control extreme variations would not be merely novel, but 
in direct contradiction with the opinion expressed by the Court 
in numerous previous instances.74 Moreover, in the twenty-five years 
since Socony-Vacuum was decided, the Court does not seem ever to 
have used that case to prevent the stabilization of extreme variations 
within the price structure. In many ways such a reading of the 
Court's opinion would entail more significant consequences than 
would a determination of the per se illegality of price exchanges. 
Certainly, a few systems of price exchange would survive such a 
test. Moreover, the logic of a holding that prohibits all types of sta-
bilizations would condemn many other forms of information ex-
change. It has been estimated that seventy-five per cent of all trade 
associations have a statistical reporting system of some sort.75 Con-
ceivably a re-examination of the effect of these statistics, particularly 
in the areas of production, inventory, and retail sales, might result 
in the demonstration of a stabilizing factor on the supply conditions 
73. 393 U.S. at 337, citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 
223 (1940). 
74. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582 (1925): 
It is not, we think, open to question that the dissemination of pertinent 
information concerning any trade or business tends to stabilize that trade or 
business and to produce uniformity of price and trade practice. Exchange of price 
quotations of market commodities tends to produce uniformity of prices in mar-
kets of the world. Knowledge of the supplies of available merchandise tends to 
prevent overproduction and to avoid the economic disturbances produced by 
business crises resulting from overproduction. 
Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 598 (1936): 
Nor does the fact that the correction of abuses may tend to stabilize a business, or 
to produce fairer price levels, require that abuses should go uncorrected or that 
an effort to correct them should for that reason alone be stamped as an un-
reasonable restraint of trade. • • . The natural effect of the acquisition of the 
wider and more scientific knowledge of business conditions on the minds of those 
engaged in commerce, and the consequent stabilizing of production and price, 
cannot be said to be an unreasonable restraint or in any respect unlawful. 
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 374 (1933): "The intelligent 
conduct of commerce through the acquisition of full information of all relevant facts 
may properly be sought by the co-operation of those engaged in trade, although 
stabilization of trade and more reasonable prices may be the result." Board of Trade 
of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1917): "The true test of legality is 
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby en-
courages competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy compe-
tition." 
75. See Jacobs, Statistical, Standardization, and Research Activities [of Trade As-
sociations], 6 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST PROC. 80, 81 (1955). 
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and hence on price. One commentator, struck by the potential scope 
of the Container Corporation opinion, has complained-and justifi-
ably so if the above interpretation is correct-that "the opinion 
could be read as making it hazardous to furnish price data to news-
papers or trade journals."76 
It is not at all clear that the majority opinion stands for so 
sweeping a definition of the term "stabilization." Certainly neither 
Justice Fortas nor Justice Marshall and the other dissenters would 
so apply the law. However, all three opinions can be read to support 
the position that price exchanges leading to stabilization are illegal 
when evidence is present that the price level itself has also been 
affected. Justice Fortas stated that "[t]he obvious effect was to 'sta-
bilize' prices by joint arrangement-at least to limit any price cuts 
to the minimum necessary to meet competition."77 The dissent 
emphasized the lack of evidence indicating an effect upon price 
levels and the necessity for such proof to justify the finding of a 
violation.78 The majority opinion, too, hinted at such a rule. In 
finding that "[t]he exchange of price information seemed to have 
the effect of keeping prices within a fairly narrow ambit,"70 the 
majority discussed the probability that while prices had sloped down-
ward, they would have declined even further had the information 
exchange not existed. 
If such an interpretation of the rule is correct, then the differ-
ences among the majority, the concurrence, and the dissent become 
simply a matter of the sufficiency of proof required to prove an effect 
upon the price level. The majority was satisfied by an "inference," 
perhaps even a slim inference, of an effect on price levels. 80 Justice 
Fortas felt that the "probability" that the exchange of specific price 
information led to an unlawful effect was adequate. 81 The dissenters 
would have required substantial proof. 82 
Under such an interpretation, the opinion in Container Cor-
poration can be construed as consistent with precedent and practice. 
Antitrust lawyers have long advised their clients that notwithstand-
ing Tag Manufacturers and Cement Manufacturers, the exchange of 
particularized information dealing with prices is suspect.83 They 
76. Hale, Communication Among Competitors, B ANTITRUsr BULL. 63, 69 (1969). 
77. 393 U.S. at 340. 
78. 393 U.S. at 341-45. 
79. 393 U.S. at 336. 
80. See 393 U.S. at 337. 
BI. See 393 U.S. at 339. 
82. See 393 U.S. at 344. 
83. See G. LAMB & s. KlITELLE, TRADE ASSOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE 68 (1956); 
Kem, Price Reporting by Trade Associations, 6 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRusr PROC. 
62, 78 (1955); Withrow, Trade Associations, 4 ANTITRUsr BULL. 173, 181 (1959); Com-
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have recognized that the dicta in Maple Flooring and the line of 
cases following it, were perhaps too broad in parts to be successfully 
reconciled with the anti-price-fixing and anti-price-stabilization 
policies of Socony-Vacuum. Particularized price information, they 
have realized, lends itself easily to concerted price-fixing activities 
and to an unconscious, but nonetheless direct, effect upon the price 
level,84 especially when current and future price information is ex-
changed.85 
ment, Trade Association Statistics and Anti-Trust Laws, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 380, 384 
(1951). See also note 91 infra. 
84. Turner, supra note 3, at 866 (footnote omitted): 
In oligopoly situations, too quick and too detailed a dissemination of information 
may make the market perform worse rather than better. It is generally recognized 
that elements of informational schemes which some might think innocuous may 
be used not for the purpose of promoting rational independent judgment, but for 
the purpose of discouraging price competition. One immediately suspects an 
illicit purpose, for example, in any informational scheme which involves the 
identification of individual sellers and buyers in each reported transaction. Nor-
mally, this is completely unnecessary to any market information scheme looking 
only to rational competitive pricing decisions. Even if the data need to be broken 
down geographically because there are different submarkets, there still is nor-
mally no need for identifying particular sellers. Consequently, it is reasonable 
to assume that the purpose of the identification is to detect and thus to dis-
courage the would be price-cutter. 
See note 62 supra. 
85. One recurring antitrust dilemma not treated by the Court in Container Cor-
poration is that involving the dissemination and publication of data to outside 
sources. The basic law concerning dissemination of statistics was expressed in the case 
of Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936). In that case the trial court, 
after discussing the Supreme Court's decisions in previous trade association cases, held 
that the failure to make more complete disclosures to the trade of statistics collected 
and circulated within their own ranks is an unreasonable restraint of trade. 297 U.S. 
at 604. The Supreme Court modified the injunction of the lower court. It agreed 
that in certain cases the "purchasing and distributing trade have a legitimate interest," 
but it stated that 
it does not follow that the purchasing and distributing trade have such an interest 
in every detail of information which may be received by the Institute. Information 
may be received in relation to the affairs of refiners which may rightly be treated 
as having a confidential character and in which distributors and purchasers have 
no proper interest. 
297 U.S. at 604. Thus, the Court manifested its preference that unless a strong policy 
dictates to the contrary, there should be open dissemination of the information 
gathered. See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1925). 
But the Court also made clear that it would look at nondisclosure not as an illegal 
action in itself, but as symptomatic of other practices which are illegal. The trial 
court had aptly summarized the Supreme Court's position: "It is thus abundantly clear 
that just as the secrecy in respect of statistics is an element of illegality in the 
'Column &: Lumber Company' and 'Linseed Oil' cases, so did the publicity given 
thereto tend to negate the illegality in the Maple Flooring case." 15 F. Supp. 817, 898 
(S.D.N.Y. 1934). Cf. Tag Mfrs. Institute v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452, 462 (1st Cir. 1949), in 
which the court of appeals said: "We are clearly of the opinion that if the reporting 
agreement is otherwise unobjectionable, it cannot be said to have become illegal for 
failure of the subscribers to make the information generally available." See also 
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 429 (1945), in which the Supreme 
Court stated: "The requirement that all trade information be given to the public 
would render the assembly of it for the information of members useless and indeed 
detrimental to competition. The inclusion of such a provision in an antitrust decree 
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An example of the exchange of such sensitive data is found in 
a recent district court decision, United States v. FMC Corporation.86 
In that case a group of chlor-alkali producers were charged with a 
conspiracy to eliminate price competition in the sale of some of their 
raw-material products. The United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that an illegal conspiracy 
existed along the lines both of that in Socony-Vacuum and of that 
in Container Corporation. The per se violation consisted of "implied 
assurances and agreements" which led to a uniform system of freight 
rate pricing. That system iri turn ensured complete information 
within the industry of all manufacturers' freight rates. As the dis-
trict court pointed out, in industries in which a single commodity 
price prevails, such as both the chlor-alkali industry and the cor-
rugated-container industry, knowledge of competitors' freight rates 
leads to universal price knowledge and, under the theory of oligop-
olistic pricing, uniformity of price. The trial court also found a 
more subtle violation of section I, similar to, though more pro-
nounced than, the violation in Container Corporation. In F1'.1C, 
as is usual in such cases, the manufacturers were faced with a highly 
inelastic demand for their product and with no probability of in-
creased sales to be derived from price cutting. Moreover, several 
of the industry's major customers from time to time found some 
chlor-alkali products to be fungible with other raw materials. In 
such situations, selective price cuts were made to specific customers, 
for the limited purpose of meeting competition from outside the 
industry. FMC and the other industry manufacturers occasionally 
informed each other of such selective discounts, apparently to im-
press one another with the limited purpose of the action. The 
district court held that this dissemination of price information in 
an effort to control industry-wide repercussions fell under the ban 
of Container Corporation. 
It is not possible to know how much weight the courts in Con-
tainer Corporation and FMC gave to the fact that current and future 
prices were exchanged or to the fact that they were exchanged sur-
reptitiously, that is, without full knowledge of parties other than 
the manufacturers. As the FMC court said, however, it is well in 
such cases to keep in mind the admonitions of the Supreme Court 
in Maple Flooring: 
[E]ach case arising under the Sherman Act must be determined upon 
has been disapproved by this co_urt." However, a survey of trade association consent 
decrees indicates the disfavor with which the courts, in practice, have viewed non-
disclosure. Given the strong policy evinced by the Court in Container Corporation 
against price information exchanges in any form, it would now seem wise to make the 
information readily and equally accessible both to purchasers and other parties. 
86. 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1969 Trade Cas.) 1) 72,901 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1969). 
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the particular facts disclosed by the record, and that the op1ruons 
in those cases must be read in light of their facts and of a clear 
recognition of the essential differences in the facts of those cases, 
and in the facts of any new case to which the rule of earlier decisions 
is to be applied.B7 
Because a market characterized by an oligopolistic price structure 
is particularly influenced by inputs of price information, it does 
not seem particularly unreasonable to adopt a harsh attitude to-
ward price exchanges. But since the exchanges of prices and other 
market information can be accomplished in many forms-some in-
volving substantially less risk than others of chilling price compe-
tition-it would be unreasonable and harmful to condemn all such 
forms out of hand under a per se rule which was only obliquely 
suggested by the majority opinion in Container Corporation.BB Thus, 
the "rule of reason" interpretation seems to be the more appropriate 
reading of the Court's holding. 
87. 268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925). 
88. Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964), provides: 
Nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case 
thus made by showing that his lower price was made in good faith to meet an 
equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a 
competitor. 
In interpreting this provision dealing with the "meeting the competition" defense, the 
Supreme Court in FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759-60 (1946), stated: 
Section 2(b) does not require the seller to justify price discriminations by showing 
that in fact they met a competitive price. But it does place on the seller the 
burden of showing that the price was made in good faith to meet a competitor's . 
• • • The statute at least requires the seller, who knowingly discriminated in price, 
to show the existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent person 
to believe that the granting of a lower price would in fact meet the equally low 
price of a competitor. 
In view of this language, antitrust attorneys have long counseled their clients to grant 
discriminatory lower prices "only when [they] know in advance that a competitor is 
offering a lower price to a given customer, as attempts to justify lower prices extended 
without such price knowledge have not always met with success." McClatchey, Price-
Discrimination, Meeting Competition and Promotional Allowances, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 
314, 326 (1968). It has not, of course, been generally recommended that to benefit from 
the "meeting the competition" defense under the Robinson-Patman Act, a client 
should check with a competitor. The possible implications of doing so were evident 
even before Container Corporation. However, the very real problem of verification 
remains and may be greatly exacerbated by an apparent conflict between the teaching 
of Container Corporation and the increasingly rigid burden of showing "good faith" 
which was exemplified in the recent case of Viviano Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 411 F.2d 
255 (3d Cir. 1969). In that case, the court of appeals held that the defendant had failed 
to fulfill its duty to investigate or verify the oral communication of its customer con-
cerning a competitive offer, despite the fact that its salesman of eighteen years cor-
roborated the customer's report. The court did say, however, that it sympathized with 
the difficulty facing the petitioner in finding precise information as to the identity of 
the competitor and the amount of the offers. 411 F.2d at 258. Thus, if Viviano Macaroni 
stands for the proposition that a "meeting the competition" defense cannot be main-
tained by seeking verification with the buyer or with one's own salesman, and if 
Container Corporation clearly precludes checking with the competitor, what possible 
method is left in most instances to verify adequately the existence of a competitive 
offer? See Handler, Antitrust: 1969, 55 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 161, 177 (1970). 
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Moreover, the stringent "rule of reason" test arguably formulated 
in Container Corporation would probably not have disastrous prac-
tical implications, since the vast majority of statistical exchange 
programs in the United States are managed in a far more discrete 
manner than was used in the Container Corporation situation. 
Usually, a statistical exchange is handled through the offices of a 
private statistical-compiling service retained by an industry-wide 
trade association. As in Maple Flooring, each competitor sends his 
own specific statistical data to the central agency, and the agency 
in turn compiles the information into averages, categorized by prod-
uct and geography. The general averages are then disseminated 
not only to manufacturers but also to all interested parties. Thus, 
each seller knows only the industry-wide price structure and is able 
to compare that structure with its own prices.89 Clearly, this proce-
dure involves a "stabilization" of prices to the extent that it imposes 
some price order in the industry. But arguably the effect on price 
competition is not at all the same as it was in Container Corporation 
in which it was found that the sellers met or just slightly undercut 
prices quoted by the relevant competitor. The ordinary program, 
it can be argued, is still legitimate after Container Corporation. The 
quality of the price information exchanged, not the existence of the 
exchange, would be determinative. 
Regardless of the difficulties in interpreting the Court's holding, 
however, it is clear at least that the opinion in Container Corpora-
tion vests great opportunities for discretion and flexibility in the 
Justice Department and in the Federal Trade Commission. The 
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, 
Richard A. McClaren, has already stated that Container Corpora-
tion "stands for the proposition that such checking with competitors, 
where it has become a prevalent market practice, constitutes a vio-
lation of Section I of the Sherman Act. "90 It appears, however, that 
the Justice Department has not yet served notice that it intends to 
use this case to invalidate all statistical- or price-reporting services. 
The situation as it now stands can best be summarized in the words 
89. See G. LAMB & S. KrrrEu.E, supra note 26, at 32. 
90. Speech before the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association, 5 CCH 
TRADE REG. REP. 1f 50,235, at 55,469 (March 27, 1969) (emphasis added): 
I doubt that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Container Corporation 
has materially changed the advice that the antitrust bar has been giving to clients 
for, lo, these many years. You have advised and, in private practice, I advised: 
"Don't call up your competitor to check if he actually made the offer your cus• 
tomer claims to have received." w·e thought-if he gives you a dishonest answer, 
it is worthless; if he is honest, you have antitrust problems. Container confirms 
the latter point. It stands for the proposition that such checking with competitors, 
where it has become a prevalent market practice, constitutes a violation of Section 
1 of the Sherman Act. In a future case, on similar facts, I think we would have to 
give serious consideration to filing on the criminal side. 
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of Justice Holmes: "Certainty generally is an illusion, repose is
not the destiny of man."91
91. The Path of the Law, 10 HA~v. L. Rav. 457, 466 (1897).
Notes
